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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a highly integrated
economic area with a large number of interactions between the participating
countries. Given the presence of externalities, the design of macroeconomic
stabilization policies is a crucial issue. In the literature on macroeconomic
policy analysis, the issue of coordination of stabilization policies has been an
important aspect.1 The coordination of macroeconomic policies concerns (i) the
issue of coordination of monetary and …scal policies and (ii) the coordination of
stabilization policies among di¤erent countries. Most studies use static models,
in which generally only two (often symmetric) countries act. In the EMU case,
most of these studies argue that the introduction of the EMU, which implies a
common monetary policy and restrictions on …scal policy at the national level,
increases the need for macroeconomic policy cooperation due to the various
interactions and externalities from national macroeconomic policies. However,
given the potentially adverse reaction by the European Central Bank (ECB),
as a result of free-riding and/or a con‡ict on the orientation of the policy mix,
…scal coordination might likely be counterproductive. The introduction of a
third player may have dramatic e¤ects on the standard propositions based on a
two-country model.2 For example, Rogo¤ (1985) and Kehoe (1988) suggest that,
in this case, cooperation may be counterproductive since the introduction of a
third player may turn the prisoners’ dilemma in a deadlock game.3 Di¤erent
types of games are mutually compared by Carraro (1997).
Although the usefulness of studying macroeconomic stabilization in a dy-
namic context is well known in the literature4, almost all studies related to a
common monetary area use a static model to derive policy recommendations.
This paper analyzes the design of macroeconomic stabilization policies and their
coordination in EMU using an explicit dynamic structure in which all aspects of
policy coordination have an explicit time and timing dimension. In particular,
policy strategies, the externalities and the payo¤s obtained by a coalition of
the policy-makers who coordinate their policies depend crucially on the other
policy-makers’ behavior over time in this dynamic approach.
Coordination of (national) …scal policies and (a common) monetary pol-
icy will be investigated by focusing on the role played by: i) asymmetries (in
structural and preference parameters), ii) externalities, which are the key to
endogenously explain the coalition formation, and iii) the existence of a multi-
1See Daniels and Vanhoose (1998) for a recent survey and, among others, Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma et al. (2001), and Buti and Sapir (1998) for a discussion related
to the EMU context.
2Notwithstanding the consideration of the ECB can sometimes be considered as the intro-
duction of a third player, the generality of the results cannot automatically be extended to a
three-country monetary union without further investigations.
3In the deadlock game the non-cooperative strategy is dominant (as in the prisoners’
dilemma) and non-cooperative behavior is better than cooperation. Therefore, no rational
players will cooperate.
4As stressed, e.g., by Turnovsky (1988), Neck and Dockner (1995), and Engwerda et al.
(2002).
2country context, all in a dynamic set-up. The paper addresses the question how
coalitions among …scal and monetary authorities are formed within the EMU
and what are their e¤ects on the stabilization of output and prices. In par-
ticular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of
di¤erent institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act.
The e¤ects of policy coordination will be studied by using the concepts of
strategic bargaining applied to dynamic non-cooperative game theoretic models
introduced in the EMU context by van Aarle et al. (2001a,b).5 The formation
and consequences of coalitions of policy-makers is one of our main interests and
will be investigated by using the recent endogenous coalition formation theory.
This recent literature on endogenous coalition studies non-cooperative games
where the players can play alone (as a ’singleton’) or share their preferences
with other players (coalitions). Therefore, this approach is particularly suited
to study the interactions among players in environments where externalities
occur.6
This paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model of Engwerda et al.
(2002) in two ways. First, we explicitly introduce the issue of endogenous coali-
tions. Second, the analysis of macroeconomic stabilization policies is extended
to a three-country monetary union. More in detail, we use the partitioned game
approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. According to Yi
(1997), this approach consists in reducing a game in normal form to a two-stage
game (a partitioned game). In the …rst stage policy-makers try to form coalitions
among them by playing non-cooperatively according to di¤erent possible initial
assumptions (to which di¤erent equilibrium concepts correspond). Afterwards,
in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed (or the singletons) play
non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies to face an asymmetric
shock in a dynamic environment as that described in Engwerda et al. (1999)
and (2002).
The model is solved by numerical simulations, which are performed by using
“ad hoc” parameter values. This procedure is rather usual in the literature; see
e.g. Turnovsky et al. (1988), Hughes Hallett (1987), Neck and Dockner (1995),
and Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996). A notable exception is Carraro (1997),
who combines model estimation, preference revelation and game simulation in
a single experiment by assuming no shift of regime during the period which is
considered by him. However, in our case several additional problems prevent
econometric estimation, e.g. assumptions about regime shifts are extremely
di¢cult to be formulated, too few data are available,7 and, also related to this,
it is virtually impossible to determine a long-run equilibrium, which is necessary
to de…ne the variables of our model.
5Early research (e.g. Plasmans and de Zeeuw (1980)) has focused on axiomatic bargaining
behavior of a similar issue in a non-cooperative setting.
6Examples of such applications are common in the literature on environmental economics
(see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1992) and Carraro (1998)). But, recently, endogenous
coalition formation theory has also been applied to contexts which are more similar to that
of our paper, e.g., on the formation of trade blocks by Baldwin (1995) and on the formation
of a monetary union by Kohler (2002).
7The EMU exists only since January 1999.
3In our numerical simulations we will consider a model of the EMU based
on three countries where the national governments and the ECB have di¤erent
priorities. The governments are mainly concerned with output stabilization
whereas the ECB’s primary target (according to art. 105 of its mandate) is price
stabilization in the Euro-area. In addition, we introduce de…cit stabilization as
an explicit objective of the individual governments. By doing this we include the
…scal stringency requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as an element in
the decision making problem of the …scal authorities. Interest rate smoothing is
included in the ECB objectives. In the EMU context it is interesting to analyze
how such externally imposed institutional restrictions on policy instruments
a¤ect the design of optimal policies and aspects of policy cooperation.
In our model di¤erent forms of asymmetry may be investigated: countries
may have asymmetric structural model parameters (model asymmetry), policy-
makers may have di¤erent preferences (preference asymmetry), policy-makers
may have di¤erent bargaining powers (power asymmetry), and, …nally, shocks
may asymmetrically hit countries (shock asymmetry).
In this paper we restrict our attention to three realistic scenarios where
several policy regimes (coalitions among policy-makers) are analyzed:
a) A benchmark three-country monetary union with model and power sym-
metry. In this case, apart from the shocks, the only form of asymmetry
is the di¤erent priority placed on output and price stabilization by the
governments and the ECB, respectively.
b) A three-country monetary union with model symmetry but power asym-
metry, where at least one …scal authority participating in a …scal coalition
has a lower bargaining power than one of the other participants.
c) A three-country monetary union with model asymmetry (measured by
di¤erent degrees of openness and competitiveness), characterized by the
ECB, two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to
competitiveness than a third country.
Regarding the preference asymmetry, we always assume that the …scal au-
thorities have the same preferences (mainly concerning output stabilization),
but these preferences will be di¤erent from those of the ECB (mainly concern-
ing price stabilization).8 Shock asymmetry will always be present as we will
explain later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a stylized
model of macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU. Section 3 analyses coali-
tion formation (coalitions as policy regimes) in the context of macroeconomic
stabilization policies in the EMU. To do so, concepts of endogenous coalition
formation are introduced. Section 4 develops simulations of numerical examples
to provide further insights in the basic mechanisms and intuitions. Section 5
concludes by summarizing the main …ndings of our analysis. In the Appendix
mathematical derivations are gathered.
8Other cases of preference asymmetries are not introduced for reasons of brevity.
42 A simple dynamic EMU model
The following IS-AS three-country model of the EMU is analyzed:
!1(")=#1$1(") ¡ %1&1(")+’12(1(")+’13(2(")+)12!2(")+)13!3(")
!2(")=#2$2(") ¡ %2&2(") ¡ ’21(1(")+’23(3(")+)21!1(")+)23!3(") (1)




in which ! denotes real output, ( the competitiveness of a country vis-à-vis an
other country (i.e. (1("): =*2(") ¡*1("); (2("): =*3(") ¡ *1("); (3("): =*3(") ¡
*2(")), & the expected real interest rate, * the price level, $ the real …scal de…cit,
and ,! the common nominal interest rate. All the variables are in logarithms,
except for the interest rate which is in percentages, and denote deviations from
their long-run equilibrium that has been normalized to zero, for simplicity. A dot
above a variable denotes its time derivative. Although the nominal interest rate
is the same in the whole Euro area, expected real interest rates can temporarily
diverge among countries if expected in‡ation rates are di¤erent. The expected
real interest rate in country , 2f 1-2-3g9 is de…ned as the di¤erence between
the common nominal interest rate and the expected in‡ation in this country,
i.e. &"("): =,!(") ¡ _ *#
"("). Henceforth, perfect myopic foresight is assumed in
this paper, so that, in our deterministic context _ *#
"(")=_ *"(").
Equations (1) are the IS curves which give the aggregate demand (AD) in
each of the EMU countries as a function of competitiveness in intra-EMU trade,
the real interest rate, the foreign real outputs and the domestic real …scal de…cit.
Equations (2) describe the aggregate supply (AS) in each of the EMU countries.
Aggregate supply is assumed to be determined by a simple Phillips curve implied
by the existence of some rigidities in the goods and/or labor market in the short-
run. In accordance with our short-run stabilization focus, the e¤ectiveness of
…scal policy is limited to its transitory impact on output through the induced
stimulus of the aggregate demand.
The above model can be rewritten in the following reduced form for the real
9In order to save notation, we will often use ! to indicate countries or policy-makers.
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The dynamics of the model can then be represented by the following system
of …rst-order linear di¤erential equations with the competitiveness variables ("(")
for , = f1-2-3g as the state variables, and the national real …scal de…cits $"(")














5 + 21$1(")+22$2(")+23$3(")+2!,!(") (4)
T h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo ft h es t a t ev a r i a b l e s(1, (2 and (3 measures any initial dise-
quilibrium in competitiveness among the three countries. Such an initial dise-
quilibrium in competitiveness could be the result of di¤erences in …scal policies
in the past or some initial supply side (price) disturbance in some countries.
We assume that the …scal authorities control their …scal policy instrument
such as to minimize the following quadratic loss function which features domestic











in which 9 denotes the rate of time preference and 4", 5" and 6" represent
preference weights that are attached to the stabilization of in‡ation, output and
…scal discipline, respectively. The …scal instrument in the countries’ loss function
may re‡ect the possibility that excessive de…cits in the EMU will be subject to
sanctions, as proposed in the “Excessive De…cit Procedure” of the Treaty of
Maastricht on the European Union (art. 104c), which was signed in 1991, and
its more recent extension to the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997. Therefore,
countries will prefer low …scal de…cits to high de…cits. Another way to formulate
this is that the Stability and Growth Pact introduces de…cit stabilization, or
de…cit smoothing, as an explicit objective of …scal policy design. More in general,
costs could also result from undesirable debt accumulation and intergenerational
10See the Appendix for the highly non-linear speci…cation of the reduced form parameters
as a function of the structural form parameters of equations (1) and (2). Notice that the
matrix coe¢cients in the reduced form model (3) are the real output elasticities with respect
to the state and control variables of the model.
6redistribution that high de…cits imply and, in that interpretation, 6" could also
re‡ect the priority attached to …scal retrenchment and consolidation.
As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB directs the common mon-
etary policy at stabilizing prices and, as long as not in contradiction to price
stabilization, stabilizing output in the aggregate EMU economy. An important
question concerns the (mix of) monetary policy instruments operated by the
ECB. In particular the discussions have centered around the distinction be-
tween an interest rate targeting strategy and a monetary targeting strategy.11
In the …rst case the short-term interest rate is the main policy instrument, in
the second case some monetary aggregate is targeted by the ECB. While both
strategies will in principle have broadly the same e¤ects, their exact transmis-
sions are somewhat di¤erent.12 Since interest rate targeting policies and interest
smoothing objectives are currently receiving much attention in monetary policy
analysis (see e.g. Taylor (1999) and Sack (2000)), we choose the EMU-wide
nominal interest rate as the ECB’s monetary policy instrument and add an in-
terest rate smoothing objective in ECB’s cost function e.g. to express the ECB’s
caution in setting the monetary policy. Consequently, we assume that the ECB













where _ *! :=
P3
"=1 4!" _ *" and !! :=
P3
"=1 5!"!"; 4!" and 5!" indicate the
relative weights of country ,’s in‡ation and output in the average in‡ation and
output considered by the ECB.






f:|(");":(")g7¡%($¡$0)8" , 2f 1-2-3-<g (7)
where :|("): =[ (1(")-( 2(")-( 3(")-$ 1(")-$ 2(")-$ 3(")-, !(")], 8& := 4&+
2
& + 5& for
= 2f 1-2-3g, 8! := 1,a n d;" are coe¢cient matrices de…ned in the Appendix.
11In‡ation (forecast) targeting has also been proposed as a third alternative monetary policy
strategy. According to this strategy a central bank compares the in‡ation forecast for some
periods ahead (e.g. two years), which is conditional on the actual short-term interest rate,
with its in‡ation target. If the forecast exceeds the target, the short-term interest rate must be
raised and vice versa. However, in‡ation (forecast) targeting does not imply a fully transparent
monetary policy since in‡ation forecasts are provided by the central bank. Hence, the in‡ation
(forecast) targeting is not further explored in this paper. In static models this monetary
strategy has, however, been discussed in more detail for the EMU (see e.g. Svensson (1999)).
12In the monetary targeting case, the common money supply is exogenous and it is assumed
to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB. The common interest rate then clears the
common money market. In the interest rate targeting case, the common nominal interest rate
is assumed to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB and the common money market is
cleared by adjustments in the money supply. In Engwerda et al. (1999) the ECB implements
a monetary targeting strategy, whereas in van Aarle et al. (2001 a,b) the ECB adopts an
interest rate targeting strategy.
7Henceforth, for reasons of convenience, we assume that "0 =0and 9 is equal to
zero.13
3 Policy Coordination: A Coalition Formation
Approach
The issue of coalition formation is analyzed by using the partitioned game ap-
proach, which reduces a game in normal form to a two-stage game (a partitioned
game). In the …rst stage policy-makers try to form coalitions among them by
playing non-cooperatively. In the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed
(or the singletons) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies
to face an asymmetric shock.
Unfortunately, game theory is far from having achieved a well-de…ned non-
cooperative theory of coalition formation. Therefore, there are several stability
concepts that can be used and that provide di¤erent equilibrium coalition struc-
tures. Di¤erent possible ways to model the endogenous coalition formation could
be helpful in deriving some indications about the optimal institutional design
of the EMU area. In fact, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1997), di¤er-
ent equilibrium concepts can be seen as di¤erent institutional contexts where
policy-makers act. Such a kind of investigation might be particularly interest-
ing in the current European debate where the “…nal asset” of the EMU is still
under discussion.
More in detail, the possible candidate equilibrium concepts for the …rst stage
of the game can be grouped in three main categories.
1. The standard Nash equilibrium concept introduced in the coalition liter-
ature by the seminal studies of d’Aspremont et al. (1983) in the indus-
trial organization literature and its several variants as surveyed in Carraro
(1998).
2. The equilibrium concepts related to a sequential entry approach (Sequen-
tial Negotiation Equilibrium).14 With such an approach, one player af-
ter the other decides to propose a coalition to the other players. These
decisions are determined by non-cooperative best-reply rules, given the
coalition structure and the allocation in the previous rounds. One of the
nice features of this approach is that it might explain in terms of history
why speci…c stable coalitions are reached among the many possible ones.
In other words, the importance of historical relationships between nations
might be captured by this approach.
13Assuming " di¤erent from zero, the model could easily be solved following the procedure
used in this paper after a simple transformation of variables, i.e. transforming #($) into
%¡ 1
2 "##($) and substituting & by & ¡ 1
2"’ where ’ 2 IR 3£3 is a diagonal matrix with ones on
the main diagonal (see Engwerda et al. (1999), p.263, for further details).
14See, e.g., Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999).
83. The solution concepts based on the idea of indirect domination, which
implies farsightedness (Farsighted Coalitional Equilibrium; see, e.g., Chwe
(1994), and Mariotti (1998)). The indirect domination concept captures
the idea that each agent (or coalition of agents), who deviates from a given
coalition structure, has anticipated further deviations of other agents.15
In this paper we focus on the …rst kind of solution concepts for reasons of
brevity and to keep the model simple. However, some intuitions based on an
informal discussion of the e¤ects of the other two strands of solution concepts
will also be presented.
The second stage of the game (when coalitions have already been formed)
is solved by using the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept as presented in the
previous section.16.
To formalize possible types of coordination behavior among policy-makers,
we have to introduce some additional notation. We call a coalition any non-
empty subset of the policy-makers’ set (i.e. the set formed by all policy-makers
f1-2-3-<g). Moreover, we assume that policy-makers in a coalition coopera-
tively set their instruments in order to minimize a common loss function, i.e.
a convex combination of their respective loss functions. A coalition structure
is a partition of the policy-makers’ set into coalitions. Therefore, each coali-
tion structure is associated with a policy regime, i.e. which policy-makers are
cooperating and which are not.
Indicating by >" a generic element (coalition) of the coalition structure ­
(policy regime), we can formally represent the policy coordination game for
each given policy regime as obtaining the (open-loop) Nash equilibrium of the
















8" 8>" 2 ­-8= 2 >" (8)
15More in detail, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1998), a multi-stage negotiation pro-
cedure that implies farsightedness can be described informally in the following way. At each
stage, a coalition structure (strategy pro…le) is the current status quo. Then, one policy-
makers’ coalition may be formed and di¤erent sets of strategies may be proposed so that
another status quo can be reached. If somebody else (either a policy-makers’ coalition or a
single policy-maker) deviates from the status quo, all members of that coalition are free to
propose to deviate further. The deviating coalition may be the same initial coalition. This
means that there is no permanent commitment: agreements between member policy-makers
are no longer binding when the status quo changes. The policy-makers are only interested in
the loss associated with a permanent status quo. So, the process continues in this way until
there is a status quo from which nobody wishes to deviate. At this point coalitions are de…ned.
Hence, the farsightedness characteristic replaces the Nash myopic behavior by a longer-term
horizon.
16We assume that there does not exist a transfer mechanism which compensates those agents
who may loose by joining (leaving) the coalition (e.g. side-payments). However, the existence
of a transfer mechanism does not seem to be compatible with the EMU context. This does not
mean that transfer mechanisms cannot be analyzed (see e.g. Casella (1999) and Engwerda et
al. (2002)). These are not considered here, also for reasons of conciseness.
9where 3"(") is the loss function of the coalition >" and ?& is the policy-maker
=’s bargaining weight in the coalition >".17 The number of coalitions acting in
each regime is clearly equal to the cardinality of ­, for example if ­ is equal
to f(1-2-3)-<g, the number of coalitions is equal to 2 and 31(") is the loss
associated with the (full) …scal coalition while 32(") is that associated with the
ECB.
The minimization of the loss function(s) (8) subject to the system (4) of










A =: ª(­)((")@ (9)
where (|("): =[ (1(")-( 2(")-( 3(")] with the initial disequilibrium ((0) =: (0 2 IR
3,
and the matrix ª(­) is computed via the eigenstructure of a matrix that is
determined by the coalition structure ­ (see Appendix).
Note that according to (9) the optimal strategies are a linear feedback rule
on the state variables and are moreover depending on the coalition structure in

















for , 2f 1-2-3-<g.
Using the policy-makers’ optimal costs (10), we will consider the following
policy regimes:
(a) The non-cooperative solution f1-2-3-<g, where no policy coordination
occurs.
(b) The grand coalition f(1-2-3-<)g, where all policies are set in a cooperative
manner.
(c) The full …scal coalition f(1-2-3)-<g and the partial …scal coalitions: f(1-2)-
3-<g, f(1-3)-2-<g and f1-(2-3)-<g, where some (or all governments)
agree to coordinate the setting of their …scal policy.
Partial coalitions involving the ECB and one or two countries are not con-
sidered for the following reasons. First, the ECB is a common institution.
Therefore, partial coalitions between the ECB and only some countries in the
Euro area are, in principle, di¢cult to justify. Second, previous studies (see van
Aarle et al. (2001a,b)) show that, in general, these coalitions are in most cases
unlikely to arise since they imply losses for the coalition members being higher
than those associated with the non-cooperative solution. Third, considering
17It is trivial that when ($ is a singleton )% =1and when equal bargaining powers are
assumed )% is equal to 1 divided by the cardinality of ($.
10also the coalition involving the ECB notably increases the number of possible
coalitions with another twelve policy regimes a¤ecting the compact exposition
of the results.
As said above, we mainly restrict our attention to the …rst mechanism of
coalition formation: the coalitional Nash equilibrium (CNE), although other
solution concepts (sequential and farsightedness equilibria) will also brie‡y be
discussed. A CNE is an equilibrium of a one-shot game where agents simulta-
neously face the problem of accepting or rejecting a proposal that consists in
sharing their loss function and cooperatively setting their instruments. After
that all agents’ decisions are taken, the CNE is formed. More formally the CNE
is characterized by two properties:
1. Pro…tability property. The losses in the coalition must be lower than
or equal to the non-cooperative losses for all coalition members.
2. Stability property:( a )internal stability: the loss of each coalition mem-
ber must be lower than or equal to the loss that the same policy-maker faces
when she defects from the coalition and the other members do not change
their strategies; (b) external stability: the losses of each non-coalition
member must be lower than the losses that the policy-maker faces when
s h ej o i n st h ec o a l i t i o n .18 A coalition (structure) is said to be stable if it
is both internally and externally stable.
Pro…tability assures that the coalition is convenient for its members, while
stability guarantees that the equilibrium is self-enforcing. A CNE is based on
the following assumption: when leaving (joining) a coalition, each agent as-
sumes that the other agents are not changing their strategies. In other words,
this assumption is equivalent to the assumption of the Nash conjectures in a
simultaneous oligopoly game where a player assumes no change in the other
players’ decision variable(s) when she modi…es her own decision variable(s).19
Under the assumption that non-members can join an existing coalition with-
out the permission of the existing members (open membership assumption),
pro…tability and stability completely characterize a CNE equilibrium.
Coalition theory often uses other assumptions as exclusive membership and
coalition unanimity (Bloch (1997)). Exclusive membership means that potential
coalition members cannot enter the coalition without the permission of the coali-
tion members. In this case, an equilibrium is characterized by the pro…tability
and the internal stability properties. Assuming coalition unanimity means that
the whole coalition is assumed to collapse when one of its members defects.
Hence, an equilibrium under unanimity is fully characterized by pro…tability
only. Notice that in the EMU context most economic policy measures should
be decided by all the members through a quali…ed or unanimous majority.
18Yi (1997) denotes this condition by the term “stand alone stable”.
19The above de…nition of stability coincides with the de…nition of a stable cartel provided
in the oligopoly literature (see d’Aspremont et al. (1983)).
114 Numerical simulations
4.1 The scenarios
We investigate three possible realistic scenarios where all policy regimes de…ned
in the previous section are considered.
I In the …rst scenario we assume a monetary union with model and power
symmetry (symmetric countries). This scenario basically represents the
extension to a three-country case of the two-country model considered by
van Aarle et al. (2001a,b) in a similar game.
II In the second scenario we assume a monetary union with model symmetry
but power asymmetry (e.g. large vs. small countries). More in particular,
one …scal authority (small country) has a lower bargaining power than the
other two …scal authorities (large countries).
III Finally, we consider the case of a monetary union with model asymmetry
(di¤erent degrees of openness and competitiveness), which is characterized
by two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to
competitiveness than a third country.
In all the numerical simulations we assume that the governments’ priority
is real output stabilization while the ECB, which equally weighs all countries,
is mainly concerned about price stabilization. In particular, the …scal policy-
makers are assumed to have the same preferences but, in general, policy-makers
will have di¤erent preferences (preference asymmetry). More in detail, the
policy-makers’ preferences are assumed to be described by the following val-
ues: 4 =0 @2, 4! =0 @8, 5 =0 @4, 5! =0 @3, 6 =0 @15,a n d9 =0 @15.M o r e o v e r ,
the initial state of the EMU area is assumed to be equal to (
|
0 =[ 0 @05-0-¡0@05].
This initial state corresponds to the case of an asymmetric price shock in the
EMU (shock asymmetry) where, initially, prices in country 2 are 5% higher than
in the two other countries. This implies that the low-price countries 1 and 3
initially face favorable terms of trade with respect to the high-price country 2,
and therefore, real output deviations will be positive in the low-price countries
and negative in the high-price one. The other parameters used in the numerical
simulations, as well as the results of our experiments, are described in detail in
the following subsections.
Notice that, considering the shock asymmetry, the …rst benchmark scenario
shows two full symmetric countries (countries 1 and 3) whereas scenarios II and
III involve that all countries are asymmetric. In fact, in the second scenario
countries 1 and 3 di¤er from country 2 according to the initial price shock, but
country 1 di¤ers from country 3 with respect to the bargaining power (power
asymmetry). In the third scenario, countries 1 and 3 again di¤er from country
2 because of (at least) the initial price shock, but country 1 di¤ers from country
3 with respect to the structural parameters (model asymmetry). Hence, our
three-country approach really extends the two-country model of the kind as in
Engwerda et al. (2002).
124.2 Scenario I - Symmetric countries (model symmetry)
In the …rst scenario, the structural (form) parameters are assumed to be the
same for all the countries (model symmetry) with the following values: the
aggregate demand elasticity # with respect to the real …scal de…cit is assumed to
be equal to 1, the output semi-elasticity % of the real interest rate is assumed to
be 0.4, the output elasticity ’ of competitiveness is assumed to be 0.2, the output
elasticity ) of foreign output (degree of openness) is assumed to be 0.4, and the
Phillips curve coe¢cient +, which measures the extent of nominal rigidities,
is assumed to be 0.25. All the policy-makers are assumed to have the same
bargaining power when they cooperate (power symmetry). In this scenario,
t h es o l ef o r mo fa s y m m e t r yi sr e l a t e dt ot h ep r i c es h o c k( s h o c ka s y m m e t r y )
which makes the (high-price) country 2 di¤erent from the other two symmetric
(low-price) countries.
Table 1 presents the results of our …rst numerical simulation. These results
widely re‡ect the model and power symmetries assumed. As in a two-country
model (see e.g. van Aarle et al. (2001b)), where these kinds of symmetries are
considered, there is no di¤erence between the grand coalition B and the full …scal
coalition C. This occurs because of two characteristics of this scenario related
to the symmetry assumptions. First, as shown in …gures 1 and 2 below, the …scal
policies of the low-price (high-output) countries are exactly o¤set by the …scal
policy of the other country, due to the model symmetry and the preference
symmetry among …scal authorities. Second, due to the model symmetry, the
ECB does not a¤ect the dynamics of the competitiveness since changes in the
common nominal interest rate equally a¤ect all the prices. Results dramatically
change when partial …scal coalitions are formed, even in this symmetric setting.
With partial …scal coalitions all the players, including the ECB, are directly
a¤ected in their optimal policies and losses. However, since countries 1 and 3
(low-price countries) face the same shock their optimal losses are the same (or
symmetric in the partial coalitions with the country which su¤ers from high
prices).
[around here table 1]
In all the regimes, the higher-price country su¤ers from higher optimal costs
since it faces a positive price shock (increase in price) while the other two coun-
tries face a negative price shock. Consequently, the ECB will mainly pursue
an restrictive monetary policy in order to stabilize the output (prices) in the
low-price countries.
Pro…table regimes are the …scal regime C (and the grand coalition B)a n d
the partial coalitions between the high-price country and one of the other two
((1-2) and (2-3)), while the coalition between the low-price countries (1-3) is
not pro…table. This result seems to con…rm that …scal coordination is counter-
productive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the case of cooperation
between two symmetric countries that face the same kind of price shock (fully
symmetric countries), cooperation increases the countries’ optimal losses. This
result, which is often observed for the two-country models, is due to the central
13bank’s action, which o¤sets that of the …scal players.20 Cooperation between
countries that face asymmetric shocks (i.e. all the coalitions where the high-
price country is included) is pro…table. Related to this observation, in a three-
country context, cooperation between symmetric countries becomes pro…table
if they also cooperate with a third asymmetric country.
Regarding the stability property, all the pro…table coalitions are internally
stable but only the full …scal coalition (and the grand coalition) is also exter-
nally stable. Therefore, the full …scal and the grand coalitions are the CNE
of the game. This result derives from the following two characteristics of the
numerical simulation. First, the ECB cannot neutralize the cooperation among
…scal players (if they are not all fully symmetric). Second, free-riding behavior is
not optimal for the …scal players since, when they leave the full …scal coalition,
they su¤er higher (optimal) costs.
Considering di¤erent games of endogenous coalition formation (e.g. sequen-
tial entry or farsightedness), it is easy to argue that the …nal equilibrium will
always be the full …scal coalition (or the grand coalition) since it is the …rst best
for all the policy-makers.
[around here …gure 1 and 2]
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative
and the cooperative21 regimes are reported in …gures 1 and 2, respectively. In
both regimes, the ECB is inactive, the …scal policies in the low-price (high-
output) countries 1 and 3 are restrictive, whereas the high-price (low-output)
country 2 chooses a …scal expansion policy. However, when policy-makers co-
operate in order to internalize the externalities, the governments of the low-
price countries pursue less restrictive …scal policies, whereas country 2’s …scal
authority pursues a less expansionary …scal policy than that pursued in the non-
cooperative case. The e¤ects of the cooperation are higher volatilities (spreads)
of output and in‡ation in all countries. Therefore, the reason of the lower losses
associated with cooperative regimes has to be found in the more moderate use
of the …scal instruments.
4.3 Scenario II - Large vs. small countries (power asym-
metry)
Table 2 describes the results of our second numerical simulation where we inves-
tigate the power distribution among EMU policy-makers. We consider the same
situation depicted in the previous numerical simulation (model symmetry), but
now we assume that country 3 has always a lower bargaining power when it
cooperates with the (an) other policy-maker(s) (power asymmetry).22 More in
20The robustness of this result was veri…ed with respect to a broad set of model parameters.
21Since in this scenario the full …scal and the grand coalitions coincide, we speak of coop-
erative regime to indicate both of them.
22The bargaining power of a country can be assumed to be an increasing function of its
relative size (e.g. the share of its GDP with respect to the aggregate GDP of the EMU).
14detail, country 3 (the small country) is assumed to have a bargaining power
equal to 1
5 in the grand coalition regime (while the other players share the rest,
i.e. each of them has a bargaining power equal to (1¡1
5)
3 ), the small country’s
bargaining power is assumed to be equal to 1
4 in the full …scal regime (others
3
8), and it is assumed to be equal to 1
3 when the small country cooperates with
one of the other countries (2
3). Of course, the (optimal) losses associated with
the non-cooperative regime and the coalition between the large country 1 and
the large and high-price country 2 are the same as in table 1. In this scenario,
all the countries are asymmetric through the combination of the power and the
shock asymmetries.
As in the previous scenario the coalition between countries 1 and 3 is not
pro…table. But, di¤erently from table 1, the coalition between the large high-
price country and the small low-price country (2-3) is not pro…table. In fact,
due to the di¤erent bargaining power distribution, the coalition among the high-
price and the small countries does not show the symmetric (optimal) losses of
that between the large countries (compare the optimal losses of …scal coalitions
(1-2) and (2-3) in tables 1 and 2).
[around here table 2]
The coalition between the two large countries (1-2) is internally stable but
externally unstable since there is an incentive for the small country to join the
coalition. If the ECB is not allowed to participate to a coalition, the …scal regime
C is both internally and externally stable, and therefore, it is the CNE of the
game since it is also pro…table. But if the ECB can join the full …scal coalition,
the full …scal coalition is not externally stable any longer. The equilibrium, in
this case, turns out to the non-cooperative equilibrium since if the low-price large
country (country 1) leaves the grand coalition, it achieves a lower (optimal) loss
(recall that if country 1 leaves the coalition, the ECB is also assumed to leave
it).23
The asymmetric distribution of the bargaining power yields two e¤ects: it
reduces the willingness to cooperate of the low bargaining power country and it
redistributes the (optimal) losses among the coalition members in the di¤erent
policy regimes. The …rst e¤ect tends to increase the instability of the coalitions
while the second tends to reduce their pro…tability.
In order to understand the complexity of the policy-makers’ interactions,
note that if coalition members can block the entry of other policy-makers (ex-
clusive membership assumption), the coalition (1-2) b e t w e e nt h et w ol a r g ec o u n -
tries also becomes an equilibrium of the game since the (large) high-price country
2 can prevent that the small country 3 enters this coalition. Similarly, the full
…scal coalition becomes an equilibrium since the …scal authorities can prevent
that the ECB enters the coalition. Considering the unanimity assumption (i.e.
all pro…table coalitions are an equilibrium), the number of equilibria increases
23Note that the CNE is the …rst best for the low-price countries 1 and 3, while the high-price
(large) country prefers the grand coalition.
15since three policy regimes are pro…table, i.e. the grand coalition B, the full …scal
coalition C, and the partial …scal coalition (1-2). The e¤ects of farsightedness
are also notable. In our example, consideration about farsightedness does not
enforce the full cooperation, as usual. In fact, in our case, when policy-makers
deviate from pro…table but unstable coalitions, they always join a stable and
pro…table coalition structure.24
[around here …gure 3]
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative
and the full …scal cooperative regimes can be compared by looking at …gures
1 and 4. In both regimes, the …scal policies in low-price (high-output) coun-
tries 1 and 3 are restrictive, and the …scal policy in the high-price country 2 is
expansionary. When the full …scal cooperation is considered all …scal policies
are smoothed (i.e. restrictive policies become less restrictive and expansionary
policies become less expansionary), but the ECB is no longer inactive,25 as in
the non-cooperative case, since, the …scal policies of countries 1 and 3 do not
exactly compensate that of country 2 because of the power asymmetry. The
e¤ects of cooperation on macroeconomic variables is similar to that exposed in
…gure 2, where the equal bargaining power case is depicted. However, since
asymmetric bargaining powers are assumed asymmetric di¤erences in the (op-
timal) individual losses of the national …scal authorities are due to the ECB
intervention.
4.4 Scenario III - Di¤erent openness and competitiveness
(model asymmetry)
In the third scenario, we remove the assumption of model symmetry. We con-
sider the following changes in the structural (form) parameters presented in
our …rst two scenarios. Countries 2 and 3 are assumed to be subject to a
high structural form output elasticity of competitiveness vis-à-vis country 1
(’21 = ’31 =0 @4;o t h e r’( are assumed to remain the same at a value of 0@2).
Changes in country 1’s income are assumed to have a strong impact on the other
countries ()21 = )31 =0 @5) but income changes in countries 2 and 3 are assumed
to have marginal e¤ects on country 1 ()12 = )13 =0 @1). Changes in the income
of countries 2 and 3 are assumed to have a moderate e¤ect on the income of
the other country ()23 = )32 =0 @3). These parameters imply that countries 2
and 3 are (relatively) more open and are more exposed to international com-
petitiveness within EMU than country 1. The above parameterization implies
several structural externalities because of the changes in the output elasticities
of openness and competitiveness. An equal bargaining power (power symmetry)
24However, further simulations, not reported here, show that increasing the bargaining
power asymmetry, the incentive to deviate rises and, in this case, if pro…tability is still satis…ed,
farsightedness reinforces the (full) …scal regime and the grand coalition solutions. See also
van Aarle et al. (2001a) for the two-country case.
25Monetary policy becomes tightening.
16and the same asymmetric price shock (shock asymmetry) as in the previous two
numerical simulations are assumed . Therefore, all the countries are asymmetric
through the combination of the model and the shock asymmetries.
Table 3 describes the results of our …nal numerical simulation.
[around here …gure 3]
Despite the fact that several asymmetries are present, no coalitions are prof-
itable. This means that the unique CNE is the non-cooperative regime, which
is not the …rst best for any of the policy-makers. The e¤ects of cooperation
on the policy-makers’ (optimal) losses are rather complex. All the cooperative
regimes are pro…table for the high-price country 2, but all the coalitions includ-
ing country 2 imply higher (optimal) losses for the other participant(s). The
sole pro…table coalition for the low-price (open) country 3 is the partial coalition
with the other low-price country 1. However, the optimal strategy of country 1
is to free-ride since its optimal strategy is always to avoid cooperation with the
other policy-makers.26
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables associated with the non-
cooperative regime is described in …gure 4. Since the country one’s restrictive
…scal policy has a large negative e¤ect on the outputs of countries 2 and 3, the
ECB follows an expansionary monetary policy. The …gure 4 clearly illustrates
that model asymmetries imply a very di¤erent (optimal) behavior of the policy-
makers.
[around here …gure 4]
Taking into account the other endogenous coalition formation games, the
lack of pro…tability implies that a solution being di¤erent from the non-cooperative
one will never emerge. Therefore, under this parameterization, the non-cooperative
result is quite robust with respect to di¤erent speci…cations of the coalition for-
mation process (e.g. exclusive membership, sequential entry or farsightedness).
The ultimate non-cooperative result seems to show that the existence of
asymmetries is a necessary condition to observe gains in the cooperation but it
is not a su¢cient condition.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper focuses on how coalitions among …scal and monetary authorities are
formed and what are their e¤ects on the stabilization of output and in‡ation. In
doing that, we introduce a novelty in the literature by combining the following
two aspects of policy coordination:
(a) macroeconomic stabilization policies of individual countries and a com-
mon central bank of a monetary union are considered in a three-country
dynamic model,
26The …rst best policy regime (coalition structure) for country 1 is the …scal coalition be-
tween the …scal authorities of the other two (more open) countries.
17(b) coalition formation among policy-makers to coordinate their policies is
explicitly considered by using the recent approach of endogenous coalition
formation theory.
More in detail, our paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model
of Engwerda et al. (2002) by using the partitioned game approach of the en-
dogenous coalition formation literature. This approach consists in reducing a
game in normal form to a two-stage game. In the …rst stage policy-makers try
to form coalitions among them by playing non-cooperatively according to dif-
ferent possible initial assumptions (to which correspond di¤erent equilibrium
concepts). Afterwards, in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed
(or the individual policy-makers) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabi-
lization policies to face an asymmetric shock in a dynamic environment.
Coordination of (national) …scal policies and (a common) monetary policy
was then investigated through several numerical simulations where we have con-
centrated our attention on the role played by asymmetries (in structural and
preference parameters) and externalities, which are the key to endogenously
explain the coalition formation.
We have considered three scenarios for numerical simulations: i) a mone-
tary union composed by three symmetric countries, that face an asymmetric
shock, ii) a monetary union where a small country interacts with two large
countries, that face an asymmetric shock, and iii) a monetary union composed
of two (relatively) open countries that face an asymmetric shock, and interact
with a (relatively) closed country. From our numerical simulations …ve major
conclusions can be derived.
1. Regimes di¤erent from the grand coalition, the full …scal coalition, and the
non-cooperative regime are never an equilibrium of the game. In fact, the
full …scal coalition is always the equilibrium in the …rst scenario and it is
also so in the second scenario according to some equilibrium concepts only,
whereas the grand coalition is an equilibrium only in the …rst case (where
it coincides with the full …scal coalition because of the symmetries). In
the third scenario, the non-cooperative regime is the equilibrium of the
game for all equilibrium concepts considered.
2. As for the static two-country models, …scal coordination seems to be
counter-productive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the …rst
scenario countries want to cooperate only if they are subject to asymmet-
ric shocks. However, considering three countries, two symmetric countries
can bene…t from cooperation if they coordinate their …scal instrument with
that of a third asymmetric country.
3. In our benchmark case (the …rst scenario) cooperation always implies the
lowest losses for all …scal authorities without a¤ecting the optimal cost
of the ECB. Therefore, it turns out to be the equilibrium of the game
irrespective of the equilibrium concept that is used to solve the game.
184. Under asymmetric bargaining powers (scenario two) the full …scal coalition
di¤ers from the grand coalition and the equilibrium of the game depends
on the assumptions considered. However, the grand coalition is never an
equilibrium of the game, whereas the full …scal coalition is an equilibrium
(but not unique) under the unanimity and exclusive membership assump-
tions.
5. In the third scenario, the less open and less exposed to intra-EMU com-
petition country always wants to free-ride and does not want to cooperate
w i t ht h em o r eo p e na n de x p o s e dc o u n t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h em o r eo p e n
and exposed counties do not want to cooperate with each other. Hence,
this scenario, where many asymmetric externalities are present, illustrates
that the existence of asymmetries and externalities is a necessary but not
su¢cient condition for cooperation since the unique equilibrium is the
non-cooperative solution.
We think that this latter observation deserves further attention, so that we
would like to investigate the impact of the sign and the size of spillovers on
coordination in the near future. In addition, we would like to explicitly consider
di¤erent equilibrium concepts and study how they are related to the institutional
setting of the EMU.
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Reduced form of the model
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20with :|("): =[ (1(")-( 2(")-( 3(")-$ 1(")-$ 2(")-$ 3(")-, !(")].
The coe¢cients of the dynamic law of motion of the system _ ((")=1((")+ P3










+2.21 ¡ +1.11 +2.22 ¡ +1.12 +2.23 ¡ +1.13
+3.31 ¡ +1.11 +3.32 ¡ +1.12 +3.33 ¡ +1.13

















































































where 7" is a vector with all entries equal to zero, except for entry , that is equal
to one.




































































































21The basic algorithm to derive the game solutions
The algorithm is described by the following 5 steps.
1. Factorize matrices ;" as
;" =
0
B B B B
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for , 2f 1-2-3-<g,w h e r eF" 2 IR 3£3; G", H", I" 2 IR 3£3; and the other
coe¢cients are scalars.
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; = M1 + M2Q¡1M3
224. After computing the eigenstructure of ;, take three positive eigenvalues
and the corresponding eigenvectors S" (for , 2f 1-2-3g) to write the following
expression:27
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where BH" := U"T¡1.
5. Rewrite the cost functions of the policy-makers and the dynamics of the
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where T" solves the following Lyapunov equation:
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Cooperative solutions are achieved by using the same algorithm and factor-
izing ;" matrix in a similar way as in van Aarle et al. (2001b).
27If matrix * has more than three positive eigenvalues multiple equilibria arise, whereas if
this matrix has less than three positive eigenvalues no equilibrium exists (for more details see
Engwerda (1998)).
23Table 1 - Optimal Costs (multiplied by 1,000)28
LB B C (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
Country 1 0@7092 0@4911 0@4911 0@5470 0@8067 0@6883
Country 2 2@8368 1@9642 1@9642 2@0661 2@7533 2@0661
Country 3 0@7092 0@4911 0@4911 0@6883 0@8067 0@5470
ECB 000 0 @0035 0@0140 0@0035
Average ¡ 0@7368 0@9821 1@3066 0@8067 1@3066
Table 2 - Optimal costs (multiplied by 1,000)
LB B C (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
Country 1 0@7092 0@5370 0@4355 0@5470 0@7364 0@4564
Country 2 2@8368 1@8760 2@1058 2@0661 2@6462 2@6363
Country 3 0@7092 0@5372 0@4448 0@6883 1@2475 1@1444
ECB 00 @0020 0@0627 0@0035 0@0752 0@6798
Average — 0@7380 0@9954 1@3066 0@9919 1@8904
Table 3 - Optimal costs (multiplied by 1,000)
LB B C (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
Country 1 0@6197 0@6918 0@6206 0@9572 0@7740 0@5164
Country 2 4@5840 3@5406 3@7709 3@6855 4@7241 2@0314
Country 3 0@5487 0@6759 0@5912 0@7560 0@5166 1@9514
ECB 0@0161 0@0246 0@0013 0@0177 0@0520 0@0104
Average — 1@2332 1@6609 2@3214 0@6453 1@9915
28In all the tables, columns identify policy regimes; rows 2 to 5 indicate the policy-makers’























































































































































































































































Figure 4 - Non-cooperative regime in scenario III
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